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  • 10:00am-2:00pm(JST)

For Researchers

Special Lectures: “Lectures on Auction Theory” Professor Isa Emin Hafalir（University of Technology Sydney）

We will host the special lectures “Lectures on Auction Theory” by Professor Isa Emin Hafalir（University of Technology Sydney） on July 14th and 18th, 2025 (JST).

Workshop Information

Dates & Times:

  • Lecture 1. Monday, July 14th, 2025, 10:30am-12:00pm(JST)
  • Lecture 2. Monday, July 14th, 2025, 1:30pm-3:00pm(JST)
  • Lecture 3. Friday, July 18th, 2025, 10:00am-11:30am(JST)
  • Lecture 4. Friday, July 18th, 2025, 12:30pm-2:00pm(JST)

Venue: 
The Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo
*Classrooms will differ depending on the day of the event. Please see the program section for details.

Hongo Campus Map

Form of the event: In-person and Zoom online (hybrid)

Language: English

Co-host: ERATO KOJIMA Market Design Project

Organizers: 

  • Fuhito Kojma (Director of UTMD, Research Director of ERATO KOJIMA Market Design Project)

About registration

There is no registration fee, but pre-registration is required.
Please sign up through the form below for both online and in-person registration.

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Speaker Profile

Professor Isa Emin Hafalir

Professor of Economics
University of Technology Sydney

 

Program

Lectures on Auction Theory

Date & TimeVenueSubtitle

Mon, July 14th
10:30am-12:00pm

Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Kojima HallLecture 1
“Basic auction theory”
Mon, July 14th
1:30pm-3:00pm		Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Kojima HallLecture 2
“Basic auction theory”
Fri, July 18th,
10:00am-11:30am		Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima HallLecture 3
“Asymmetric Auctions with Resale”
“Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions”

Fri, July 18th,
12:30pm-2:00pm

Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima HallLecture 4
“When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions”
“A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints”

Background Readings
(a) A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
(b) Asymmetric Auctions with Resale
(c) Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
(d) When Speed is of Essence Perishable Goods Auctions

*All times are Japan Standard Time.

Contact Info

The University of Tokyo Market Design Center（UTMD）
Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo
E-mail: market-design[at]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Phone: (+81)3-5841-3441