[UTMD-120] A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices (published in ‟Games and Economic Behavior”, by Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa)

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa

We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. 

*Published in “Games and Economic Behavior” Volume 150, 1-26, 10, 2025
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001684