9:00am-12:20pm(JST)
学生・研究者向け
2024-25 Rising Stars in Market Design
UTMDは、11月26日に2024-25 アカデミックジョブマーケットに参加する若手研究者による国際ワークショップ “2024-25 Rising Stars in Market Design” を開催いたします。
開催概要
日時:2024年11月26日(火)9:00am-12:20pm (JST)
開催方法:Zoomを使ったオンライン開催となります。(事前登録制)
言語:英語
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参加方法について
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締切: 2024年11月25日(月)昼12時まで
プログラム
時間 | スピーカー | タイトル |
---|---|---|
9:00-10:00am | Ermis Soumalias | Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising |
10:10-11:10am | Kei Ikegami | Bargaining over Leasing Contracts amid Shifting Power Balance |
11:20am-12:20pm | Lea Nagel (Stanford University) | As-If Dominant Strategy Mechanisms |
※時間はすべて日本標準時です。
スピーカー

Ermis Soumalias
(University of Zurich)
Title: Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising
Abstract: The next frontier of online advertising is revenue generation from LLM-generated content. We consider a setting where advertisers aim to influence the responses of an LLM to align with their interests, while platforms seek to maximize advertiser value and ensure user satisfaction. The challenge is that advertisers’ preferences generally conflict with those of the user, and advertisers may misreport their preferences. To address this, we introduce MOSAIC, an auction mechanism that ensures that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for advertisers and that aligns the utility of each advertiser with their contribution to social welfare. Importantly, the mechanism operates without LLM fine-tuning or access to model weights and provably converges to the output of the optimally fine-tuned LLM as computational resources increase. Additionally, it can incorporate contextual information about advertisers, which significantly improves social welfare. Through experiments with a publicly available LLM, we show that MOSAIC leads to high advertiser value and platform revenue with low computational overhead. While our motivating application is online advertising, our mechanism can be applied in any setting with monetary transfers, making it a general-purpose solution for truthfully aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents over LLM-generated replies.

Kei Ikegami
(New York University)
Title: Bargaining over Leasing Contracts amid Shifting Power Balance
Abstract: This paper presents a model where contract renewals and terms are negotiated based on past performance, which influences renewal through two channels: altering the bargaining environment and shifting the power balance between parties. Applied to shopping mall leasing contracts, my analysis reveals that fluctuations in the balance of bargaining powers alter the mall’s share of surplus by 10%. Controlling for bargaining power enables a clearer identification of contract term determinants. Notably, the mall managers’ risk preferences affect contract selection, with the potential to double rental income by changing the managers under the same power balance with the tenants.
JEL Classification Codes: C71; C78; L81; R32; R33.
Keywords: Contracting; Nash Bargaining; Renegotiation; Shopping Center; Tenancy; Tenant.
JEL Classification Codes: C71; C78; L81; R32; R33.
Keywords: Contracting; Nash Bargaining; Renegotiation; Shopping Center; Tenancy; Tenant.

Lea Nagel
(Stanford University)
Title: As-If Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Abstract: We show that achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility often requires to choose a mechanism which severely limits what agents can observe about others’ previous moves. However, experiments and theoretical arguments suggest increasing the transparency of a mechanism’s extensive form can improve reliability of its predictions—even if it breaks the dominant strategy property. To help resolve this dilemma, we define as-if dominant strategy mechanisms: (i) Each agent has at least one strategy that becomes dominant if the others were restricted to behave as if the mechanism was static, and (ii) all combinations of such strategies are ex-post equilibria. These mechanisms look like a dominant strategy one to cognitively limited agents who neglect others may condition their behavior in sophisticated ways, and can help them avoid dominated behaviors. Moreover, they ensure sophisticated agents never have an incentive to deviate. Our framework rationalizes the auction format chosen by prominent online platforms, such as eBay. It also provides a unified explanation for experimental evidence in various settings. Further, we provide sufficient conditions for as-if dominant strategy mechanisms to also be weak dominance solvable.
お問い合わせ
東京大学マーケットデザインセンター (UTMD)
東京大学大学院経済学研究科
メール: market-design[at]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
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