[UTMD-122] Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function (published in “Games and Economic Behavior”, by Shigehiro Serizawa, John A. Weymark)

Shigehiro Serizawa, John A. Weymark

For the provision of 𝑚 ≥ 1 divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite. 

*Published in “Games and Economic Behavior” Volume 149, 164-169, 2025
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001751