特別連続講義: “Potential Games, Higher Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Selection” Professor Stephen Morris（Peter A. Diamond Professor of Economics, MIT）

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Potential Games, Higher Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Selection

• References
  • Basteck, Daniels and Heinemann (2010). Characterizing Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory 163, 826-848.
  • Brandts and Cooper (2006). “A Change would Do You Good….an experimental study of how to overcome coordination failure in organizations,” American Economic Review 96, 669-693.
  • Carlsson and van Damme (1993). “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
  • Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin. “Does One Soros make a Diference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders,” Review of Economic Studies 71, 87-113.
  • Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003). “Equilibrium in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory 108, 1-44.
  • Goryunov and Rigos (2022). “Discontinuous and Continuous Stochastic Choice and Coordination in the Lab,” 206.
  • Guimaraes and Morris (2007). “Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks,” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2205-2230.
  • Halac, Lipnowski and Rappaport (2021). “Rank Uncertainty in Organizations,” American Economic Review 111, 757-786
  • Heinemann (2024). “An Experimental Test of the Global Game Selection in Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 218, 632-656.
  • Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). “The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information,” Econometrica 72, 1583-1599.
  • Kajii and Morris (1996). Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,” Econometrica 65, 1283-1309.
    • ———– (2020). “Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey,” Japanese Economic Review 71, 7-34.
  • Li, Song and Zhao (2023). “Global Manipulations by Local Obfuscation,” Journal of Economic Theory 207.
  • Mathevet, Perego and Taneva (2020). “On Information Design in Games,” Journal of Political Economy 128, 1370-1404.
  • Monderer and Samet (1989). “Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior 1, 170-180.
  • Monderer and Shapley (1996). “Potential Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 14, 124-143.
  • Moriya and Yamashita (2020). “Asymmetric-Information Allocation to Avoid Coordination Problems,” Journal of Economics and Management 29, 173-186.
  • Morris, Oyama and Takahashi (2022). “Implementation via Information Design via Global Games.”
    • ———– (2022). “On the Joint Design of Information and Transfers.”
    • ———– (2023). “Strict Robustness to Incomplete Information,” Japanese Economic Review 74, 357-376.
    • ———– (2023). “Global Game Selections in Binary-Action Supermodular Games.”
    • ———– (2024). “Implementation via Information Design in Binary Action Supermodular Games,” Econometrica 92, 775-813.
    • ———– (2026). “Strict Robustness to Incomplete Information: Addendum.”
  • Morris and Shadmehr (2023). “Inspiring Regime Change,” Journal of the European Economics Association 21, 2635-2681.
    • ———– (2024). “Repression and Repertoires,” American Economic Review: Insights 6, 13-33.
  • Morris and Shin (1998). “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,” American Economic Review 88, 587-597.
    • ———– (2003). “Global Games: Theory and Applications,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society) 1, 56-114. Blackwell.
  • Morris and Ui (2005). “Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,” Journal of Economic Theory 124, 45-78.
  • Oury (2013). “Noise Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2638-2665.
  • Oyama and Takahashi (2020). “Generalized Belief Operator and the Impact of a Small Probability Event on Higher-Order Beliefs,” Econometrica 88, 693-726.
    • ———– (2024). “Robustness in Binary Action Supermodular Games Revisited,” Japanese Economic Review 77, 1-13.
  • Rubinstein (1989). “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ‘Almost Common Knowledge’” American Economic Review 79, 385-391.
  • Sakovitz and Steiner (2012). “Who Matters in Coordination Problems,” American Economic Review 102, 3439-3461.
  • Ui (2000). “Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,” Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
  • Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure,” American Economic Review 80, 234-248.
  • Veiel (2025). “Limits of Global Games,” University of Texas at Austin.

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