[UTMD-118] Measuring Spousal Cooperation: A Biform Game Approach to Intra-Household Allocation (by Takahiro Moriya)

Takahiro Moriya

Do households cooperate or not? Existing models force a binary choice between full cooperation and non-cooperation, yet reality likely lies in between. I develop an empirical biform game framework that identifies the degree of spousal cooperation from data. The model treats enforceable decisions (labor supply) cooperatively and non-enforceable decisions (childcare) non-cooperatively, with a caring parameter nesting both extremes. Equilibrium uniqueness and monotonicity properties deliver a novel identification strategy: the cooperation parameter is identified from slope moments—how childcare responds to wages and labor supply—rather than level moments. Applying the framework to households with disabled children, I find 33% lower cooperation, reduced paternal childcare efficiency, and shifted happiness benchmarks. Counterfactual analysis shows that even large Child SSI increases cannot realistically close the welfare gap. This highlights the fundamental limits of cash transfers and the importance of policies supporting spousal cooperation.