Stability in Matching with Externalities: Pairs Competition and Oligopolistic Joint Ventures(by Kenzo Imamura, Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan)


Kenzo Imamura, Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan


This paper presents one-to-one matching and assignment problems with externalities across pairs such as pairs figure skating competition and joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. In these models, players care not only about their partners but also which and how many rival pairs are formed. Thus, it is important for a deviating pair to know which matching will realize after it deviates from a matching (an effectiveness function) in order to define pairwise stable matching. Using a natural effectiveness function for such environments, we show that the assortative matching is pairwise stable. We discuss two generalizations of our model including intrinsic preferences on partners and pair-specific match qualities to see how our stability concept performs in these generalized models.