Special Lectures: “Potential Games, Higher Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Selection” Professor Stephen Morris (Peter A. Diamond Professor of Economics, MIT)

Workshop Information

Speaker Profile

Program

Potential Games, Higher Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Selection

• References
  • Basteck, Daniels and Heinemann (2010). Characterizing Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory 163, 826-848.
  • Brandts and Cooper (2006). “A Change would Do You Good….an experimental study of how to overcome coordination failure in organizations,” American Economic Review 96, 669-693.
  • Carlsson and van Damme (1993). “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
  • Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin. “Does One Soros make a Diference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders,” Review of Economic Studies 71, 87-113.
  • Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003). “Equilibrium in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory 108, 1-44.
  • Goryunov and Rigos (2022). “Discontinuous and Continuous Stochastic Choice and Coordination in the Lab,” 206.
  • Guimaraes and Morris (2007). “Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks,” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2205-2230.
  • Halac, Lipnowski and Rappaport (2021). “Rank Uncertainty in Organizations,” American Economic Review 111, 757-786
  • Heinemann (2024). “An Experimental Test of the Global Game Selection in Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 218, 632-656.
  • Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). “The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information,” Econometrica 72, 1583-1599.
  • Kajii and Morris (1996). Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,” Econometrica 65, 1283-1309.
    • ———– (2020). “Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey,” Japanese Economic Review 71, 7-34.
  • Li, Song and Zhao (2023). “Global Manipulations by Local Obfuscation,” Journal of Economic Theory 207.
  • Mathevet, Perego and Taneva (2020). “On Information Design in Games,” Journal of Political Economy 128, 1370-1404.
  • Monderer and Samet (1989). “Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior 1, 170-180.
  • Monderer and Shapley (1996). “Potential Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 14, 124-143.
  • Moriya and Yamashita (2020). “Asymmetric-Information Allocation to Avoid Coordination Problems,” Journal of Economics and Management 29, 173-186.
  • Morris, Oyama and Takahashi (2022). “Implementation via Information Design via Global Games.”
    • ———– (2022). “On the Joint Design of Information and Transfers.”
    • ———– (2023). “Strict Robustness to Incomplete Information,” Japanese Economic Review 74, 357-376.
    • ———– (2023). “Global Game Selections in Binary-Action Supermodular Games.”
    • ———– (2024). “Implementation via Information Design in Binary Action Supermodular Games,” Econometrica 92, 775-813.
    • ———– (2026). “Strict Robustness to Incomplete Information: Addendum.”
  • Morris and Shadmehr (2023). “Inspiring Regime Change,” Journal of the European Economics Association 21, 2635-2681.
    • ———– (2024). “Repression and Repertoires,” American Economic Review: Insights 6, 13-33.
  • Morris and Shin (1998). “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,” American Economic Review 88, 587-597.
    • ———– (2003). “Global Games: Theory and Applications,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society) 1, 56-114. Blackwell.
  • Morris and Ui (2005). “Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,” Journal of Economic Theory 124, 45-78.
  • Oury (2013). “Noise Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2638-2665.
  • Oyama and Takahashi (2020). “Generalized Belief Operator and the Impact of a Small Probability Event on Higher-Order Beliefs,” Econometrica 88, 693-726.
    • ———– (2024). “Robustness in Binary Action Supermodular Games Revisited,” Japanese Economic Review 77, 1-13.
  • Rubinstein (1989). “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ‘Almost Common Knowledge’” American Economic Review 79, 385-391.
  • Sakovitz and Steiner (2012). “Who Matters in Coordination Problems,” American Economic Review 102, 3439-3461.
  • Ui (2000). “Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,” Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
  • Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure,” American Economic Review 80, 234-248.
  • Veiel (2025). “Limits of Global Games,” University of Texas at Austin.

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