Rising Stars in Market Design
We host an international workshop on market design presented by young researchers in the near future.
*All times are Japan Standard Time (JST).
*The workshop will be held online using Zoom (pre-registration system).
*Presentations are in ENGLISH.
*Please refrain from taking pictures, recording audio and video.
*Please do not reproduce the contents or share the Zoom joining URL with a third party.
Please use the following link for registration.
*The same meeting URL can be used for UTMD seminar series.
Dong Woo Hahm (Columbia University)
Date & Time: 2022/1/11(Tue) 9:00-10:30am
Title: A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice
Abstract: This paper explores the dynamic relationship between school choices made at different educational stages and how it affects racial segregation across schools. We use New York City public school choice data to ask: “How does the middle school that a student attends affect her high school application and assignment?” We take two approaches to answer the question. First, we exploit quasi-random assignments to middle schools generated by the tie-breaking feature of the admissions system. We find causal evidence that students who attend high-achievement middle schools apply and are assigned to high-achievement high schools. Second, we develop and estimate a dynamic two-period model of school choice to decompose this effect and analyze the equilibrium consequences of counterfactual policies. In our setup, students applying to middle schools are aware that their choices may affect which high schools they eventually attend. Specifically, the middle schools that students attend can change how they rank high schools (the application channel) and how high schools rank their applications (the priority channel). We find that the application channel is quantitatively more important. Using the estimated model, we ask if an early affirmative action policy can address segregation in later stages. We find that a middle school-only affirmative action policy can alter students’ high school applications and thus their assignments, contributing to desegregating high schools. This finding suggests that policy interventions for desegregation should start early.
Aram Grigoryan (Duke University)
Date & Time: 2022/1/11(Tue) 10:40am-12:10
Title: School Choice and the Housing Market
Abstract: We develop a unified framework with schools and residential choices to study the welfare and distributional consequences of public schools’ switching from the traditional neighborhood assignment to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism. We show that when families receive higher priorities at neighborhood schools, the Deferred Acceptance mechanism improves aggregate or average welfare compared to neighborhood assignment. Additionally, under general conditions, the Deferred Acceptance mechanism improves the welfare of lowest-income families, both with and without neighborhood priorities. Our work lays theoretical foundations for analyzing assignment games with externalities.
Alex Chan (Stanford University)
Date & Time: 2022/1/11(Tue) 12:20-13:50
Title: Discrimination and Quality Signals: A Field Experiment with Healthcare Shoppers
Abstract: This paper provides evidence that customer discrimination in the market for doctors can be largely accounted for by statistical discrimination. I evaluate customer preferences in the field with an online platform where cash-paying consumers can shop and book a provider for medical procedures based on a novel experimental paradigm called validated incentivized conjoint analysis (VIC). Customers evaluate doctor options they know to be hypothetical to be matched with a customized menu of real doctors, preserving incentives. Racial discrimination reduces patient willingness-to-pay for black and Asian providers by 12.7% and 8.7% of the average colonoscopy price respectively; customers are willing to travel 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of a black doctor, and somewhere between 50–100 to 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of an Asian doctor. Further, providing signals of provider quality reduces this willingness-to-pay racial gap by about 90%, which suggests that statistical discrimination is an important cause of the gap. Actual booking behavior allows cross-validation of incentive compatibility of stated preference elicitation via VIC.